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Abstract 
We examine the empirical association between customer satisfaction and tax avoidance. Customer 
satisfaction is a valuable intangible asset for most firms. On the other hand, tax avoidance is considered 
a socially undesirable corporate practice, which may harm firm reputation. Therefore, we argue that 
firms that focus on satisfying customers will avoid engaging in excessively risky tax policies.  Using 
American Customer Satisfaction Index score (ACSI) as a measure of customer satisfaction, we find 
that customer satisfaction has a negative association with uncertain tax benefits (UTB). This finding 
is supported by a positive relation between customer satisfaction and cash effective tax rate, a negative 
relation between customer satisfaction and interests and penalties imposed by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) upon tax audit. Taken together, we conclude that firms that are more concerned about 
customer satisfaction and reputation have a higher likelihood of avoiding tax aggressive activities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
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Corporate Tax Avoidance and Customer Satisfaction 
1. Introduction 
“In December 2012, Starbucks announced that it would voluntarily pay more tax in the UK than it was 
legally obliged to after a series of negative media reports about its tax arrangements, as well as the threat 
of a customer boycott. Tax has become a reputational issue.” PwC (2015, p. 4) 
  
In this study, we investigate the relation between corporate tax policies and customer satisfaction. 
While Hoi et al. (2013) and Lanis and Richardson, (2012) consider how CSR activities impact tax 
avoidance behavior, we have little understanding of how customers, possibly the most important 
stakeholders, influence corporate tax policies. Customer satisfaction is a valuable intangible asset and 
manifests itself in a firm’s reputation. Customer satisfaction is a measure of how products and services 
supplied by a company meet or surpass customer expectations. On the other hand, aggressive tax policies 
widely damage government tax revenue, tax dependent communities, public health services and social 
welfare (Slemrod &Yitzhaki 2002, Hoi et. al 2013, ). In fact, for multi-national firms that engage in 
transfer pricing and other cross-border intra-group transactions and that negotiate with weak developing 
countries for tax holidays and incentives, there could be implications for human rights abuse.1 
As a result, aggressive tax avoidance can adversely affect the firms’ reputation, firm value, brand 
value, legitimacy in society and stakeholders’ impression of firms. Therefore, we argue that firms that 
invest in customer satisfaction in order to enhance valuable intangible assets may stay away from 
                                                          
1 A report by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute ((IBAHRI) Task Force on Illicit Financial 
Flows, Poverty and Human Rights (2013” entitled “Tax Abuses, Poverty and Human Rights” highlights tax abuses 
as human rights concern. 
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engaging in risky tax policies that may impair intangible asset value.  Accordingly, aggressive tax 
avoidance practices or risky tax planning would be negatively associated with customer satisfaction.  
 
Ittner and Larcker (1998) find evidence that customer satisfaction measures are leading indicators 
of financial performance, customer growth and purchase behaviors of customers. Shares of companies 
with high ACSI scores tend to do better than shares of companies with low scores. Ittner, Larker and 
Taylor (2009) report that customer satisfaction is value relevant and that if large increases in customer 
satisfaction are reported, the market reacts very quickly. Therefore, costs of losing customer satisfaction 
due to tax aggressiveness are high. 
Research shows that maintaining customer loyalty and keeping current customers are generally more 
cost effective than attracting and bringing in new customers in many circumstances (Reinartz et al. 2005, 
Thomas 2001 & Min et al. 2016). High customer dissatisfaction can result in consumer boycott and loss 
of sales revenue. The advertising costs for repairing lost reputation and brand image are not negligible, 
especially when public relations costs are also taken into account. So the reputational costs of tax 
avoidance can be partially attributed to the customer base of a firm. 
At a superficial glance, tax evasion, deferral and avoidance of any kind may appear to be a tax saving 
cost strategy but this logic is too simplistic. Aggressive tax avoidance may attract attention from tax 
authorities and result in penalties.  If the firm’s uncertain tax positions are rejected by the tax authorities, 
not only does the firm have to pay an audit settlement but it is can also be subject to interest on the late 
payment and penalties, especially if the tax claims are considered fraudulent actions.   
We draw on several theories to justify our prediction. The corporate sustainability, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and organization theory academic literature is consistent with our prediction.  
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According to corporate citizenship theory, corporations enjoy the freedom, rights and safety to 
participate and take part in business and societal activities and in return are responsible to the society 
That is, corporations not only should respect the law, but they should also have concern for societal 
obligations and values (Lin et al. 2010). One of their responsibilities is paying their fair share of taxes. 
If firms avoid tax payment and act as free riders, society will sanction and disregard them. Customers 
are noticeable and interested citizens. 
According to legitimacy theory, firms need and desire to legitimize and sustain relationships in the 
broader social and political environment in which they operate (Gray et al. 1995). If firm’s goals do not 
align with those of the society, which is the case with tax aggressiveness, there will be a conflict or 
disparity between the firm and society (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Therefore, firms that want to satisfy 
customers will also avoid aggressive tax policies.  
According to stakeholder theory the firm ought not to be only accountable to the shareholders but to 
all stakeholders (Freeman 1984). In our opinion after government and shareholders, customers are the 
most important stakeholders in terms of corporate tax decisions, so their satisfaction and expectations 
have to be taken into account in firm tax behavior.  In the marketing literature, reputation, brand value, 
brand image and brand loyalty are concepts that can be influenced in a negative or positive manner by 
tax avoidance and other (Rust & Zahorik 1993) decisions made by management (Austin & Wilson 2015, 
Gallemore et al. 2014, Bloemer & Kasper 1995).  
  Looking from a risk perspective, the relation between customer satisfaction and tax avoidance is 
double edged. It is not apparent whether the two will have a positive or negative association. On the one 
hand, we conjecture that firms can offset the excess risk of tax aggressiveness by investing in customer 
satisfying practices, suggesting a positive relation between customer satisfaction and UTB. On the other 
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hand, risk averse firms would try to reduce their tax-firm risk by being in tax compliance (Henlon and 
Slemrod 2009) and simultaneously try to reduce their customer-market risk by being customer friendly 
and having good customer relations (Tuli and Bharadwaj 2009).  
We collected customer satisfaction data from the ACSI website. Claes Fornell first developed ACSI 
as an economic indicator to measure satisfaction of company customers. ACSI has used proprietary 
methodology in order to calculate customer satisfaction for 10 economic sectors, 43 key industries and 
hundreds of firms that represent a share of the American economy. ACSI customer satisfaction data is 
used in academic research in accounting, marketing and economics journals. 
In our analysis, we use unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) and interests and penalties (I&P) as our 
proxies for aggressive tax avoidance and cash effective tax rates as a proxy for general tax avoidance. 
We mainly use UTB and I&P due to their distinctive features in capturing non-conforming tax 
avoidance. UTB is a good measure of the firm’s current tax policies and is visible to the stakeholders 
because of the FIN 48 disclosure requirement. The I&P are consequences of unfair tax planning. 
We find that customer satisfaction has a negative association with uncertain tax benefits (UTB). A 
positive relation with cash effective tax rate and a negative relation with interests and penalties imposed 
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) upon tax audit supports this finding. We conclude that firms that 
are more concerned about customer satisfaction and reputation have a higher likelihood of avoiding tax 
aggressive activities. 
This study fits well in the growing and emerging literature in sustainability and tax avoidance and 
adds value to the ongoing research.  The work builds and extends Hoi, Wu and Zhang (2013). We 
contribute to their study by introducing a decisive stakeholder and finding a significant result by 
accurately choosing effective tax avoidance proxies.      
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Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) also make the point that the focus for researchers and tax politicians 
should be to target deliberate and intentional actions at the aggressive end of the continuum. In this 
context, our results on uncertain tax positions and excessive tax actions are relevant to tax academicians 
and government tax officials. Our work is distinguished from previous work in that we find a significant 
non-financial, marketing indicator that is associated with corporate tax avoidance. Using the ACSI 
measure can shed light on the details of the CSR-TAX relation and brings in prominent and determined 
stakeholders (customers and consumers) in this context.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
The neo classical theory views corporations as profit-maximizing and transactional economics views 
them as cost-minimizing entities. There are limitations to these views that do not take into account 
consequences of certain behaviors. Research on the corporate culture must consider different aspects of 
corporate social responsibility and the value creation and value sustainability it offers (Foss & Klein 2010, 
Hodgson 2010). One of the main roles that firms play is the role of a corporate citizen and a committed 
institutional taxpayer. Tax payments of a firm have direct and indirect effects on different stakeholders. 
They directly affect government budgets and funds available to policy makers and social planners and 
indirectly affect other involved stakeholders such as employees or their representatives and even non-
profit organizations and charities. An important group affected is customers, which is our focus in this 
research paper. 
In recent years, the public has become more sensitive and involved regarding the socio-economic 
impact of firms. One significant aspect of this is the tax payments of firms to governments. Public reaction 
to tax evasions and even tax avoidance has intensified recently. We have come to a point where we see 
whistle blowers and independent reporters uncovering big tax scandals by both institutions and 
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individuals. We now see celebrities, politicians and well-known businesses losing reputation, respect, 
getting penalized and even serving prison time because of their tax avoidance and evasion actions. The 
recent Panama files scandal and the Spanish Royalty Court are just two famous examples.     
  Although there is an abundant literature relating sustainability and corporate social responsibility to 
firm tax behavior in general, little has been done to study the effects of different stakeholders on 
aggressive and risky tax policies. We build our study on a number of theories including sustainability 
theory, legitimacy theory, tax incidence theory, citizenship theory and utility theory.   
Tax avoidance and CSR 
Corporate social responsibility could potentially influence tax aggressiveness in terms of how a 
corporation develops systems and processes with regard to the well-being of society as a whole (Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006b, Williams, 2007, and Avi-Yonah, 2008). Governments may not force 
corporations to engage in CSR activities but they should encourage companies to do so (Avi-Yonah et 
al. 2008). Socially irresponsible activities are widely damaging to customer base, reputation, brand image 
and shareholder value (Hoi et al. 2013). Firms that engage in excessively irresponsible corporate social 
activities are more aggressive in avoiding taxes – they have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-
sheltering activities and adopting more uncertain tax positions (Hoi et al. 2013). Lanis and Richardson 
(2012, p. 86) conclude “the social investment commitment and corporate social responsibility strategy 
(including the ethics and business conduct) of a corporation are important elements of corporate social 
responsibility activities that have a negative impact on tax aggressiveness.”   
Risk and customer satisfaction 
A look into the finance-marketing literature reveals that customer satisfaction reduces firm risk. Tuli 
and Bharadwaj (2009) find empirical support for their hypothesis that positive changes (i.e., 
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improvement) in customer satisfaction result in negative changes (i.e., reduction) in overall systematic 
and idiosyncratic risk. Fornell et al. (2006) show that investments based on customer satisfaction produce 
sizable excess returns. They find a positive and significant relation between market value and customer 
satisfaction and that satisfied customers are economic assets with high returns. Corporate social 
responsibility can be used to model and build customer loyalty. Management can view corporate social 
responsibility as a long-term investment in the customer base (Albuquerque et al. 2012). However, the 
customer loyalty and customer satisfaction relation is not linear (Bowen et al. 2001).  
Customers and corporate tax  
 Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) study market reaction to media news and announcements about a 
company’s engagement in tax sheltering and aggressive taxing strategies in the retail and advertising 
industries, which are hugely retail customer based. They conclude that since these industries are mainly 
customer based rather than project or investment based, a portion of the market reaction and investor’s 
negative attitude towards tax sheltering firms is due to customer dissatisfaction and even consumer 
boycott. Their study of tax avoidance and firm value indicates consumer reaction to corporate tax 
avoidance in the retail business. Excessively aggressive tax avoidance can result in consumer boycott.  If 
the society labels a firm as a bad corporate citizen or a poor taxpayer in the public and social media this 
could badly damage their image, corporate social responsibility reputation and loose public trust. (Henlon 
and Slemrod 2009). 
Desa i and Dharmapal (2009) focus on the costs associated with aggressive tax policy by firms, 
managers taking more risk and tax cover-up costs, but they do not mention reputation costs or customer 
loss costs of any kind. Tax avoidance activity does not result in simply transferring value from the state 
to the shareholder’s pocket. Thus, it may be costly to the firm (Desai and Dharmapala 2009).  
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Corporate citizenship 
There is no direct polling system on society opinion about corporate culture and corporate societal 
impact except for a number of social media campaigns and multimedia news. Customer satisfaction can 
serve as a proxy for society members’ beliefs and attitude towards a corporation. Therefore, we introduce 
the corporate citizen concept into our paper to explain why customers care about corporate activities and 
why corporations care about customer satisfaction. Corporations can be citizens (Moon, Andrew Crane, 
Matten 2005). We use Corporate Citizenship as a recognition that a business, corporation or business-
like organization, has social, cultural and environmental responsibilities to the community in which it 
seeks a license to operate, as well as economic and financial ones to its shareholders or immediate 
stakeholders to define the term. 
Tax payment is among the fundamental roles in which corporate citizens engage with the society 
(Christensen and Murphy, 2004). Lanis and Richardson (2012) propose that society should consider tax 
aggressive companies irresponsible and illegitimate members. Citizens in a society have bilateral 
opinions and care about one another’s impact on society. Corporations are similar to individual citizens 
in their rights and responsibilities. Just as an individual citizen does not have a legal requirement to aid 
her fellow citizens, the corporation may not have a requirement to engage in CSR. This point was clearly 
elaborated and emphasized in the paper “Corporate social responsibility and strategic tax behavior” (Avi-
Yonah et al. 2008). Just like an individual citizen, a corporation is legally required to pay taxes, and is 
expected not to engage in over-aggressive tax planning to minimize its tax obligations. (Avi-Yonah et al. 
2008). If firms fail to pay tax revenue, this can result in hostility, reputational damage among its 
stakeholders at best and even loss of business operations (Landolf, 2006; Erle, 2008; Hartnett, 2008) 
Legitimacy theory 
Running head: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Customer Satisfaction 11 
 
The next stream of research we study is legitimacy theory, which gives better insight into 
understanding the importance of consumer satisfaction when companies make decisions that affect 
taxpayers. Legitimacy theory explains why firms care about sustainability and their corporate social 
position and responsibility.  
Corporations will not survive if they are not legitimate no matter how successful they are in terms of 
performance and profits, so they seek to legitimize and sustain relationships in the broader social and 
political environment in which they operate (Gray et al. 1995). Several researchers (e.g. Trotman, 1979; 
Trotman and Bradley, 1981; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 
2000; and Deegan et al., 2002) have found that corporate policies and actions that raise public concern, 
because they fall below community expectations, can contribute to the de-legitimization of a corporation. 
In order to define legitimacy, we use the definition of organizational legitimacy from Lindblom 
(1994, p.2) “a status, which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the value system of 
the larger social system of which an entity is a part”. If the firm’s values and goals do not align with those 
of the society, there will be a potential or actual conflict or disparity (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). 
Who pays corporate income taxes? Understanding the distribution of corporate tax share among 
stakeholders is vital in understanding why employees, customers and citizens hold a stake in a 
corporation’s tax position and why they are sensitive to corporate tax avoidance. Previously, economists 
believed that it is the firms themselves that paid taxes (Harberger 1962), but further research shows that 
this is inaccurate. Workers, customers and shareholders end up paying corporate taxes. Tax burden theory 
allocates shares of tax payment among consumers through higher prices of products, workers through a 
lower wage rate, and the firm through lower market share and lower rates of return (Fullerton, Metcalf, 
2002).   
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There is a gap in the research literature between the fields of accounting and marketing or more 
precisely between tax and consumer behavior. This paper contributes to the literature by studying the 
effects of customer satisfaction on corporate tax behavior. Building on the above literature review we 
conjecture that socially responsible corporations engage more in customer satisfying decisions and honest 
and fair tax policies.  
H1: There is a negative relation between customer satisfaction and uncertain tax benefits (UTBs).  
Risk management theory 
The relationship between customer satisfaction and tax avoidance can be opposite to our prediction. 
Some argue that firms use CSR activities to manage corporate risks including tax avoidance risks 
(Financial Times, 2004). Hoi et al. (2013) argued that firms could use CSR activities to minimize that 
damage arising from the tax avoidance strategy. Minor and Morgan (2011) study the role of corporate 
social responsibility in maintaining and building a firm’s reputation in good conditions and repairing its 
brand image in case of scandals.  They believe that socially responsible corporate activities are a risk 
management strategy practiced by a firm to impact reputation, which, in turn, protects the firm from the 
risk of adverse political, regulatory, and social sanctions/penalties in the case of negative corporate 
events. Kim et al. (2011) find strong evidence that tax avoidance is positively associated with the future 
crash risk of firm. They argue that firm managers attribute part of risk management to their risky tax 
positions.  
Based on the risk management perspective we argue that firms will use customer satisfaction 
reputation to minimize the damage, if any, arising from tax avoidance strategy. Therefore, customer 
satisfaction may be a tool for firms to engage in tax avoidance.  
H2: There is a positive relation between customer satisfaction and uncertain tax benefits (UTBs). 
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 Why are customers a vital stakeholder? Customers are the most important group of people for any 
organization. They are the resource upon which the success of the business depends. When thinking 
about the importance of customers it is useful to remember that organizations are dependent upon their 
customers. Not developing customer loyalty and satisfaction could result in the loss of customer base 
and market share. Only by creating value for customers can companies create value for shareholders. . 
Unless motivated by an exceptional event or experience, consumers rarely become proactive 
advocates for or against a given company’s products and services. However, when mobilized an existing 
customer base can reshape a brand’s images, define expectations of the brand for others, and drive or 
drain future business of a company. Changes in satisfaction can directly influence the rate at which 
customers not only refer business to or dissuade others away from a brand, but also the level to which 
consumers go silent due to indifference. 
 Why do customers/consumers care about corporate taxes?  There are two theories that explain the 
reason why. First is the corporate citizenship theory, second is tax incidence theory. According to tax 
incidence when companies have to pay taxes they treat it as an extra burden, an excess cost so they add 
tax costs to the price of their product or service or reduce costs from other places such as labor costs and 
employee salary in order to avoid paying the tax themselves. If there were no price elasticity in the 
supply demand curve or wage elasticity in the job market, the corporate tax burden would have fallen 
on the shoulders of employees and customers.  However, in reality, the increase in price will absorb a 
portion of consumer surplus and a portion of supplier surplus based on the elasticity and sensitivity of 
other stakeholders. Customers are aware of this. So actually, a share of the corporate tax actually has 
the same nature as sales tax to them. Customers are conscious and boundedly rational decision makers 
who are concerned about corporate decisions that they believe relate to them and interest them directly 
Running head: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Customer Satisfaction 14 
 
or indirectly. Decisions such as brand, quality, price and our concept of interest, tax, affect them because 
they realize the company has received the customers’ share of corporate tax and is avoiding payment 
and misusing customer trust.         
On the theory of corporate citizenship, individual society members see corporations as entities that 
consume and benefit from what the society has to offer them, what governments provide to the well-
being and welfare of citizens (Moon et al. 2005). Corporations receive loans; have access to land, utilities 
and infrastructure. The law defends their rights. They have political influence through voting and 
lobbying and the host government protects and secures them from outside environment. So they literally 
benefit from society member’s rights and freedom. In return, they should also have citizen’s duties and 
responsibilities. The act of tax avoidance or evasion in any way is considered a free riding act. The social 
contract in its goal to fairness and equality is meant to suppress and eliminate free riding. If the 
community labels you as a free rider, a tax avoider or in the radical term, a tax evader and an irresponsible 
citizen, it can damage a company’s reputation and image. 
3. Research Design: 
Empirical Model 
To examine the association between tax avoidance and customer satisfaction, we estimate the 
following model using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The dependent variable Y represents three commonly used tax avoidance and aggressiveness measures: 
Log transform of unrecognized tax benefit (UTB), log transform of I&Ps, or CASH-ETR. The independent 
variable 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖−1represents the lagged (previous year) customer satisfaction score (ACSI). We 
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include a number of control variables used in previous literature. The control variables include institutional 
ownership (IO), operating cash flow (OCF), R&D, Tobin’s Q, cash, change in low carry forwards 
(ΔNOL), sales, leverage, foreign income (FI), capital expenditures (CAPEX) and life cycle proxies. 
Operating cash flow represents profitability. We use IO as a proxy for corporate governance and Tobin’s 
Q is a measure for firm value. We define control variables in the Appendix. 
Measure of tax uncertainty 
We will use the FIN-48 disclosure as a proxy for uncertain tax positions. In general, the purpose of 
FIN 48 is to standardize accounting for uncertain tax benefits and require companies to disclose their tax 
reserves (Blouin et al., 2007). Firms usually underpay tax authorities’ required amount in the tax-filing 
procedure. The courts have the right to ask for the difference in the case of deductions, credits etc. In the 
post FIN-48 era, corporations are required to estimate and set aside the tax liability and tax expense and 
take into account the uncertainty of the tax benefit related to their financial and tax positions. We use this 
reserve to pay for additional tax due to regulatory audit and litigation resolution. We define UTB as log 
(1+ TXTUBEND) where TXTUBEND is the year-end amount of uncertain tax benefits denoted in 
millions.  
Measure of I&P 
The FIN-48 rules also requires firms to disclose their accumulated interest and penalties dollar 
amounts. When firms act fraudulently, the courts convict and penalize them and they have to pay an 
amount of penalty with interest on top of that. I&P is an indicator and consequence of excessive tax 
avoidance. The riskier the company’s tax positions become the higher the probability of a penalty. We 
define I&P as log (1+ TXTUBXINTBS) where TXTUBXINTBS is the year-end amount of interests and penalties 
accrued (denoted in millions) due to uncertain tax benefits. 
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Measure of tax avoidance 
The tax avoidance literature has developed different proxies for tax avoidance. To represent firms’ 
general tax avoidance activities we use cash effective tax rates (CASH-ETR). We measure CASH_ETR 
as total cash taxes paid by a firm over the pre-tax income adjusted for special items. We should take into 
account that ETR is an inverse measure for tax avoidance 
CASH-ETR 3-Year = Total cash taxes paid (TXPD) over a period of three years scaled by total pretax 
income (PI) less special items (SPI) over a period of three years.  
CASH-ETR 3-Year =  
 
Measure of customer satisfaction 
The American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) is an economic indicator that measures the 
satisfaction of consumers across the U.S. economy. According to the ACSI website, “The American 
Customer Satisfaction Index provides unique customer experience benchmarking capabilities that come 
from the Index’s one-of-a-kind, cross-industry structure.” Again, according to the ACSI website ACSI 
uses proprietary methodology in order to calculate customer satisfaction for 10 economic sectors, 43 key 
industries and hundreds of firms that represent a share of the American economy. Within each industry 
group, several representative industries are included based on total sales. Finally, within each industry, 
we select the largest companies such that coverage included the majority of each selected industry’s sales. 
For each firm, surveyors conducted approximately 250 interviews with the firm’s current customers. 
              TXPDt + TXPDt-1 + TXPDt-2 
(PIt + PIt-1 + PIt-2) - (SPIt + SPIt-1 + SPIt-
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Accordingly, ACSI uses a multiple indicator approach to measure overall customer satisfaction as a latent 
variable. The result is a latent variable score or index that is general enough to be comparable across 
firms, industries, sectors, and nations. 
Interests and Penalties (I&P) 
A tax penalty and interest is levied on a corporation for not paying enough of its total estimated tax 
and withholding. In other words, if a corporation has an underpayment of estimated tax, they may be 
required to pay a penalty with interest. Taxpayers are required to make quarterly estimated tax payments 
before each tax year ends. However, accurate estimation requires accurate prediction of the future, so 
taxpayers sometimes underestimate the amount due. There is a penalty for under-estimating tax payment 
or having too little tax withheld, and interest is calculated and added to the amount to the owed amount 
that was not. The IRS Notice 433 is a document published by the Internal Revenue Service that outlines 
the interest rate applied to overpaid or underpaid taxes, as well as the interest rate applied to the 
underpayment of estimated taxes. The interest rate can vary from time to time, but typically ranges from 
4-10%. Underpayment of corporate taxes can impose significant costs on firms, and the IRS will continue 
to charge interest until the firm pays the amount owed in full. Taxpayers are also subject to a late filing 
fee for missing the file reporting deadline, beside a fee for late payment 
4. Sample Selection 
We used three sources to collect our data. The tax avoidance data was extracted from Compustat. The 
customer satisfaction data was gathered from the American customer satisfaction index (ACSI) website.  
We extract the institutional ownership data from the ownership database of Thomson Reuters.                                        
The initial customer satisfaction data provided 3,011 firm year observations. However, we delete 
observations if they are from the utilities industry (SIC codes 4900-4949) and financial industry (SIC 
Running head: Corporate Tax Avoidance and Customer Satisfaction 18 
 
codes 6000-6999). We delete observations for having missing values for the following variables: sales, 
dividend, tax variables values. For R&D, we replace missing values with zero. If we observe negative 
values for capital expenditures, tax expenses, UTB, AS, IPs or net income, we delete them. We bound 
CASH ETR between 0 and 1. Based on contemporary tax literature we also try to avoid outlier problems 
so we winsorize variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Our final sample consists of 1,082 firm year 
observations. Our sample covers the period between 1994 and 2014. However, the UTB and I&Ps start 
from 2007 due to FIN 48 disclosure requirement.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for independent and dependent variables are presented in Table 1. In the sample, 
the average 3-year CASH-ETR is about 27% and the standard deviation is around 11%. The mean UTB 
in our sample is 500 million, average interest and penalties lie at 100 million and for UTB settlements 
the number is 36 million, respectively. Comparison of UTB, I&P and settlement values points out that 
the results are skewed to the right. Since these figures are rightly skewed, we look at the mean value of 
the top quartile observations for each of these three variables. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We also find that, in the sample, average leverage is 29%. The R&D and Capex are, on average, 0.9%, 
and 6% of total assets, respectively.  We find our sample average Tobin’s Q to be 2.21. 
As can be seen, the number of observations for ETR is 1,082 while there are only 408 observations 
for UTB. This is because FIN-48 became effective in 2006 but our customer satisfaction and ETR data 
go back to 1994. Audit settlements are relatively small compared to UTB suggesting that companies 
absorb a high percentage of these benefits. The two low quartiles of R&D indicate that research and 
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development expenditures are only disclosed at high levels. For customer satisfaction, the average score 
of ACSI is 77 and the distribution shows low variance and range.  
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Customer satisfaction and UTBs 
As we discussed above, UTBs represent aggressive tax planning (Rego and Wilson, 2012). We 
hypothesize that customer satisfaction may have positive or negative impact on UTBs. Table 3 shows the 
results relating customer satisfaction to UTBs. We estimate two model specifications, one with current 
customer satisfaction and the other with lagged customer satisfaction. We use lagged customer 
satisfaction because it serves two purposes. First, it addresses an endogeneity concern that the customer 
satisfaction and tax policies may affect each other. Second, customer satisfaction may have lagged effect 
on tax strategies. For instance, high level of customer satisfaction of a firm in year t-1 may influence 
management’s financial decision-making in year t.  
In both column (1) and column (2) of Table 3, we find that the coefficients on lagged customers 
satisfaction and current customer satisfaction respectively are significantly negative at the 5 percent and 
1 percent level respectively. The economic significance is also quite high. For instance, according to the 
coefficient of lagged customer satisfaction (column 1), for a 1 point increase in customer satisfaction, 
UTB decreases by 7.89 percent (exp. (0.076) =1.0789). This highly significant economic impact of 
customer satisfaction makes sense because Ittner and Larcker (1998) find that customer satisfaction 
measures are leading indications of accounting performance, customer growth and purchase behaviors 
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of customer. High levels of UTBs invoke audits by the IRS, which may lead to interests and penalties. In 
addition, if high UTB positions result from the abuse of tax rules, firms will get public attention through 
media and press reports. This, in turn, may upset customers, potentially leading to boycotting the products 
and services. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that firms that care about satisfying customers will tend 
to avoid taking uncertain tax positions.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Customer satisfaction and CASH-ETR 
An alternative way of investigating if customer satisfaction reduces tax avoidance or aggressive tax 
planning is to examine how it influences CASH-ETR, a commonly used proxy for tax avoidance. In 
Table 3, we present the OLS regression results depicting the relationship between customer satisfaction 
and tax avoidance where a three-year average CASH-ETR is our proxy for tax avoidance. In columns (1) 
and (2), the independent variable is lagged customer satisfaction and current year customer satisfaction 
respectively. In column (1), we find that the coefficient of lagged customer satisfaction is significantly 
positive at the 5% level while in column (2) the coefficient of current customer satisfaction is 
insignificant. The positive coefficient in column (1) implies that higher customer satisfaction discourages 
firms to engage in tax avoidance. Economically, a 10 percent improvement in customer satisfaction will 
increase a firm’s effective tax rate by 3.4 percent. The adjusted R2 is about 50 percent suggesting about 
half of the variation in tax avoidance is explained by our model, everything else considered equal. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Customer satisfaction and Interests & Penalties 
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In order to corroborate our above findings that customer satisfaction has negative associations with 
uncertain tax positions or tax avoidance, we test how customer satisfaction is related to interests and 
penalties imposed by the IRS upon conducting an audit after the tax filings. Interests and penalties result 
due to unfair, unethical or illegal tax planning. Hence, if customer satisfaction dissuades managers from 
taking risky or uncertain tax planning positions, then we will also observe a negative relation between 
customer satisfaction and interests and penalties.  
Table 4 presents the results for this relation in two columns as before: in column (1), the independent 
variable is lagged customer satisfaction and in column (2) the variable is contemporaneous customer 
satisfaction. We find that both the coefficients of the lagged customer satisfaction and contemporaneous 
customer satisfaction are significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively, implying that firms 
with higher customer satisfaction tend to pay lower interests and penalties. In terms of economic 
significance, both coefficients are almost the same. For instance, for one-point increase in customer 
satisfaction, the IPs decrease by 7.6 percent (exp. (0.0733) =1.076). This finding supports our previous 
results and adds accuracy to their robustness.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we examine the association between intangible customer value and tax avoidance. 
More precisely, we examine the relations between a customer satisfaction index and UTB, I&P and 3-
year Cash ETR. We find that firms that aggressively engage in tax avoidance activities are more likely 
to have lower customer satisfaction and generally care less about their customer/consumer relation. 
Firms that care about their reputation and customer relation engage less in tax avoidance. The proxy 
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for unrecognized tax positions is UTB based on FIN-48 requirements and the measure for customer 
satisfaction was ACSI.  
The association between customer satisfaction and UTB/I&P was negative and its association with 
cash ETR was positive since ETR is an inverse measure for tax avoidance. Based on business literature 
from various fields, we also hypothesize that both customer dissatisfaction and tax avoidance are not 
just harmful to stakeholders but also to shareholders through decrease of firm and brand value, loss of 
sales and revenue, and increase in firm risk. 
Our study is consistent with established theories in economics and strategy such as stakeholder 
theory, legitimacy theory, corporate citizenship, utility/risk aversion and sustainability theory. We 
contribute to the literature by arguing that customers are a vital and concerned stakeholder to the firm 
that can have significant impact on corporate tax policies and actions. This effect is documented by 
relations with two tax aggressiveness proxies, UTB and I&P. We conjecture that other stakeholders, 
such as the surrounding community and employees, can also have a significant impact on firm tax 
behavior. However, this was out of the paper’s scope of work and is left for future research. 
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Table A: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Mnemonic 
CASH-ETR 3-
YEAR 
Average three-years of total cash tax payment divided by three-year 
average pretax income less special items 
TXPD/(PI-SI) 
UTB Log transformed amount of unrecognized tax benefits at the end of the 
year.  
LOG (1+TXTUBEND) 
IPs The interests and penalties (TXTUBXINTBS) accrued in the balance 
sheet. We take natural logarithm of TXTUBXINTBS plus one. 
LOG(1+TXTUBXINTBS) 
SALES Log of dollar amount of Sales plus one LOG (1+SALE) 
LEVERAGE Short-term debt plus long-term debt divided by total firm assets (DLTT+DLC)/AT 
OCF Operating cash flow divided by total firm assets (OANCF/AT) 
RD Research & development  expense divided by total firm assets XRD/AT 
TOBIN’S Q Total firm assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity (AT-CEQ+PRCC_F*CSHO)/AT 
CAPEX Capital firm expenditures divided by total firm assets CAPX/AT 
Life cycle proxies Life cycle dummy variable is based on three-year average cash flows.  
INTRO Dummy variable equals one if operating (OANCF) and investing cash 
flows  (IVNCF) are negative and financings cash flow is positive 
(FINCF), and zero otherwise. 
 
GROWTH Dummy variable equals one if operating (OANCF)   and financing cash 
flows (FINCF) are positive and investing cash flow (IVNCF) is 
negative, or else zero. 
 
MATURITY Dummy variable equals one if operating cash flow (OANCF) is positive, 
and investing (IVNCF)  and financing cash flows (FINCF) are negative, 
and equal to zero otherwise. 
 
DECLINE Dummy variable equals one if operating cash flow (OANCF) is 
negative, investing cash flow (IVNCF) is positive and financing cash 
flow (FINCF) is either positive or negative, or otherwise it is equal to 
zero. 
 
FI The foreign income divided by lagged assets (AT). If foreign income 
values are missing values, we set them to zero.  
PIFO/AT 
IO . We define institutional ownership as the number of shares owned by 
institutions divided by the total number of outstanding shares.  
 
∆NOL This term represents the change in tax loss carry forward (TLCF) 
between current year and prior year scaled by lagged total asset (AT) 
(TLCFt-TLCFt-1)/ATt-1 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Std Mean P25 P50 P75 
Cash ETR 3 year 1082 0.111754 0.2712323 0.2026451 0.2737076 0.3398731 
UTB (millions) 408 939.7352 500.298 43.1685 126 431.172 
Audit Settlement(millions) 408 105.8037 36.84321 0.117 4 21 
Interest and penalties 
(millions) 
367 186.8139 100.2677 8.1 27.1 86 
Satisfaction 1082 6.334017 77.34196 74 78 82 
Leverage 1078 0.1658584 0.2884815 0.1651426 0.2768757 0.3907149 
Sales 1082 1.128008 9.365413 8.656587 9.50605 10.26733 
R&D 1082 0.0198087 0.0088185 0 0 0.0100234 
Capex 1077 0.04023 0.060387 0.0328901 0.0495072 0.0788495 
Tobin’s Q 1082 1.212682 2.216881 1.382248 1.828641 2.67013 
Cash 1081 0.109753 0.0914678 0.0179104 0.0522373 0.1194711 
IO*1000 899 2.33992 2.067439 0.8901748 1.484941 2.433546 
Δ NOL 664 0.0397224 0.0047773 0 0 0.0017724 
FI 1082 0.0397747 0.0262594 0 0.005676 0.0390875 
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Table 2:  Regression of unrecognized tax benefits (UTB) on customer satisfaction 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES UTB UTB 
   
SATISFACTIONt-1 -0.0760**  
 (0.0384)  
SATISFACTION  -0.104*** 
  (0.0381) 
CASH -0.631 -0.958 
 (1.337) (1.268) 
OCF 2.073 1.203 
 (3.401) (3.154) 
LEV 1.240 1.376* 
 (0.752) (0.728) 
SALES 1.136*** 1.074*** 
 (0.235) (0.195) 
R&D 13.83 11.65 
 (13.44) (12.48) 
CAPEX -8.301* -6.643 
 (4.909) (4.470) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.319** -0.289** 
 (0.135) (0.138) 
∆NOL -0.855 -1.375 
 (1.355) (1.519) 
FI 21.38** 20.39** 
 (9.849) (8.219) 
IO 0.0256 0.0172 
 (0.127) (0.0656) 
CONSTANT 0.0188 2.736 
 (4.268) (3.785) 
LIFE CYCLE PROXIES Yes Yes 
FF 48 INDUSTRY FIXED 
EFFECTS 
Yes Yes 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes 
N 206 217 
R2 0.776 0.784 
ADJUSTED R2 0.725 0.738 
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Table 3: Regression of cash effective tax rate on customer satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES CASH-ETR CASH-ETR 
   
SATISFACTIONt-1 0.00265**  
 (0.00123)  
SATISFACTION  0.00184 
  (0.00137) 
CASH -0.0135 0.0133 
 (0.0806) (0.0831) 
OCF 0.0526 0.0848 
 (0.0951) (0.0973) 
LEV 0.000483 -0.0119 
 (0.0374) (0.0394) 
SALES -0.0166** -0.0161* 
 (0.00802) (0.00814) 
R&D -0.346 -0.141 
 (0.802) (0.784) 
CAPEX 0.630*** 0.532** 
 (0.198) (0.205) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.00316 -0.00326 
 (0.00453) (0.00465) 
∆NOL 0.160 0.0749 
 (0.133) (0.0953) 
FI -0.111 -0.114 
 (0.181) (0.177) 
IO -0.00143 -0.000932 
 (0.00159) (0.00187) 
CONSTANT 0.187 0.323** 
 (0.140) (0.149) 
LIFE CYCLE PROXIES Yes Yes 
FF 48 INDUSTRY FIXED 
EFFECTS 
Yes Yes 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes 
N 510 564 
R2 0.554 0.535 
ADJUSTED R2 0.502 0.485 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Regression of interests and penalties (IPs) on customer satisfaction 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES IPs IPs 
   
SATISFACTIONt-1 -0.0733**  
 (0.0299)  
SATISFACTION  -0.0747*** 
  (0.0277) 
CASH -0.406 -0.406 
 (1.331) (1.414) 
OCF 5.799*** 3.794** 
 (1.578) (1.496) 
LEV -0.0533 0.0968 
 (0.457) (0.506) 
SALES 1.289*** 1.289*** 
 (0.179) (0.167) 
R&D 19.34** 15.35 
 (9.098) (9.463) 
CAPEX -10.39*** -7.008** 
 (2.983) (2.928) 
TOBIN’S Q -0.296*** -0.249** 
 (0.0881) (0.0942) 
∆NOL -1.628 -3.128** 
 (0.987) (1.465) 
FI -1.576 1.779 
 (4.254) (3.943) 
IO -0.115 0.0688 
 (0.109) (0.0526) 
CONSTANT -2.755 -2.701 
 (3.520) (3.157) 
LIFE CYCLE PROXIES     Yes Yes 
FF 48 INDUSTRY FIXED 
EFFECTS 
Yes Yes 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS Yes Yes 
N 185 195 
R2 0.856 0.842 
ADJUSTED R2 0.818 0.803 
 
 
